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French corporate governance in the new global economy: mechanisms of change 
and hybridisation within models of capitalismi
 
Ben Clift B.M.Clift@Warwick.ac.uk, Department of Politics and International Studies, 




This article analyses the implications of the internationalisation of capital markets, and 
the influx of Anglo-Saxon institutional investors, for the French model of capitalism. Its 
central contention is that the global convergence thesis misrepresents contemporary 
evolutions because it pays insufficient attention to mechanisms of change within models 
of capitalism. Secondly, framing analysis in terms of hybridisation and fragmentation of 
national models, rather than convergence, offers greater explanatory purchase over the 
French model, constitutes a more accurate characterisation, and helps avoid the 
‘convergence or persistence’ impasse within models of capitalism analysis. In exploring 
French corporate governance, it emphasises the importance of specifying the role of 
institutional mechanisms as transmission belts of change as a precursor to an assessment 
of how far shifts in international political economic context bring about changes within 
French capitalism. Focusing on financial market regulation regime, new legislation in 
corporate governance and company law, and the market for corporate control as three key 
potential mechanisms of change, it finds that pre-existing norms and structures endure, 
mediating the nature of a national political economy’s articulation with the international 
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context. Hybridisation, and recombination of capitalist institutions drawn from different 
models, provide a far more persuasive account than convergence. 
                                                 
i The author would like to thank Michel Goyer, and three anonymous referees, for helpful and 
insightful comments on an earlier version of this article. 
 
French corporate governance in the new global economy: mechanisms of change 
and hybridisation within models of capitalism 
 
There have been remarkable increases in the degree of enmeshment and 
interconnectedness of capital markets in a number of advanced post-industrial countries 
in recent decades, characterised by McGrew as the ‘financial deepening’ of globalisation, 
arising ‘out of the interaction between greater ‘financialisation’ of national economies 
and the scale of global financial activity’ (2005: 214). In the French case, the resultant 
internationalisation of capitalism has seen dramatic rises in transborder mergers and 
acquisitions, French companies listing overseas, French portfolio investment in foreign 
stock markets, and foreign ownership of stock listed on the Paris bourse. This has 
enmeshed French firms in a set of global financial markets and networks. The protective 
barriers behind which French capitalism restructured in the 1980s have become much 
more porous today, with major implications for the French political economy’s point of 
insertion into and articulation with its international context.  
 
This exploration of the implications of these changes for the political economy of French 
corporate governance is informed by combined insights of recent developments in the 
international political economy (IPE) and comparative political economy literatures. 
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There is increasing recognition that the complexity of economic globalisation generates 
‘patterns of both economic convergence and divergence’ not captured by ‘neoclassical or 
linear models of economic globalisation which equate it solely with global economic 
convergence’ (McGrew 2005: 220). Anticipation that convergence will occur and is 
needed to ‘prove’ the existence of globalisation is flawed, rooted in a textbook neo-
classical economic model, and the theoretically threadbare ‘logic of no alternative’ 
argument, both projected unhelpfully onto the global political economy. Rather, how the 
process of globalisation really ‘plays out’ is ‘highly uneven such that it is associated with 
both economic convergence and divergence, as different economies/subregions/sectors 
are differentially integrated into this globalizing world economic order’ (McGrew 2005: 
221). In this light, diversity of responses to globalisation, and the particularities of how it 
is mediated by ‘domestic’ institutions and politics, are all part of the ‘variable geometry’ 
(Castells 2000) of globalisation. 
 
Such thinking prepares the ground for cross-fertilisation between IPE and comparative 
political economy analysis. Many comparative political economy scholars have become 
increasingly frustrated with the ‘are we witnessing either convergence or persistence’ 
framing of the debate about the evolution of models of capitalism. Thus, in this case, 
either the French political economy is preserved in aspic, or the French political economy 
is continually evolving in a process of convergence. Such a cul de sac struggles to 
account for the co-existence of dramatic changes (many along similar lines in different 
cases) and enduring highly significant particularities.  
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A further problem with the convergence account is that use of ideal types leads to a 
stylised, caricatured version of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ or liberal market economy (LME) 
model becoming the yardstick by which convergence is judged. Yet the US political 
economy, for example, often fails to conform to the ideal-type supposedly so closely 
modelled upon it (see Crouch 2005: 441-2). Indeed, this is particularly true of corporate 
governance. Large US companies developed a range of anti-takeover devices (“shark 
repellents”) in the wake of the 1980s takeover boom, notably through state law legislation 
and favourable state court decisions (Monks & Minow 2004: 42, 110-120, 232-239). This 
created impediments to the market for corporate control, generating a disparity between 
US corporate governance and the LME ideal-type. 
 
A number of ways out of the ‘convergence or persistence’ impasse have been suggested. 
Hay, for example, frames his analysis in terms of ‘common trajectories, variable paces, 
divergent outcomes’ (Hay 2004), whilst others have characterised evolutions in terms of 
‘hybridisation’ (Perraton & Clift, 2004: 258; Lütz 2004: 189). Hybridisation is helpful 
because it captures the qualitative nature of change, doing less violence to the facts than a 
rather too loosely and liberally applied notion of convergence.  
 
Hybridisation itself, however, can be subject to different interpretations. Lütz’s 
sophisticated recasting of the convergence thesis talks of ‘convergence within national 
diversity’ (2004: 171) and ‘cross-national patterns of convergence and diversity’ (2004: 
184). This nuanced conception of convergence recognises that ‘cross national diversity 
also characterises the timing of regulatory efforts, and the extent of institutional change’ 
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(2004: 186), and how ‘weight shifting among actors ... takes place within institutional 
frameworks of regulation that are still diverse across countries’ (2004: 184). Thus 
‘domestic responses to globalisation’ involve a mixture of both ‘convergence’ and 
‘persistence’ (2004: 189). Yet this raises the spectre of ‘conceptual stretching’. If all 
these caveats are admitted, are we really still talking about convergence? Moreover, it is 
difficult to see how any evidence could be interpreted as contrary to this convergence 
thesis.  
 
The elision within this ‘hybridisation as convergence’ argument is to interpret all change 
(even non-convergent change) as evidence of convergence. Logically, what is being 
converged towards in this account is something rather different from the standard ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ LME ideal-type (Hall & Soskice 2001: 27-33), and to this extent it represents a 
considerable improvement on the simple convergence thesis. Nevertheless, the very term 
convergence conveys the sense of a telos at work reducing ever further the difference 
across cases. 
 
Crouch offers further potential to escape the ‘persistence versus convergence’ impasse. 
Crouch criticises the varieties of capitalism approach for being ‘fixed over time,’ making 
‘no provision for changes in characteristics’ (2005: 444). In analysing what he calls 
variously ‘capitalist diversity’, and ‘the diversity of economic institutions’, Crouch 
argues that ‘empirical cases should be studied, not to determine which (singular) of a 
number of theoretical types they should each be allocated, but to determine which (plural) 
of these forms are to be found within them, in roughly what proportions, and with what 
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change over time’ (2005: 440). The resultant ‘recombinant capitalism’ approach to 
models of capitalism analysis involves ‘deconstructing into constituent elements and then 
being ready to recombine into new shapes the aggregated forms’ (2005: 440). Through 
this lens, a more differentiated political economy of capitalism can be analysed, 
accounting for change without reference to convergence. 
 
This article adopts such an approach, and illustrates its relevance through a focus on 
specific mechanisms of change within French capitalism. These mechanisms of change 
do not receive the attention they deserve within much comparative institutional political 
economy analysis.  Indeed, Campbell argues that ‘institutionalists rely on causal concepts 
but often without specifying the underlying mechanisms or processes by which change 
occurs … vague concepts end up carrying much of the argument when, in fact, 
mechanisms should be doing the work’ (2004: 5). The mediation of McGrew’s ‘financial 
deepening’ of globalisation through these mechanisms of change explains why 
hybridisation, and ‘recombination’ of different capitalist forms are the most likely 
outcomes, rather than convergence, or ‘dual convergence’ on the liberal and co-ordinated 
varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001; for a critique see Hay 2004: 232-8).  
 
The focus here on French corporate governance identifies the key mechanisms of 
restructuring, and assesses the degree of change within French capitalism. Corporate 
governance involves a key ‘nexus of institutions’ (Cioffi 2000: 574) through which 
governments, state actors and stakeholders organise and regulate corporate and economic 
activity. Its impact on actors’ behaviour, norms and incentive structures shapes how 
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capitalism works in any given setting. Key mechanisms of change within corporate 
governance, often associated with restructuring along the lines of Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism, include the market for corporate control, transparent accounting, and 
shareholder value norms.  
 
This analysis of the role of institutional mechanisms of change within French corporate 
governance suggests a rethinking of ‘institutional complementarity’, normally seen as the 
cement which ensures persistence of Varieties of Capitalism (Hall & Soskice 2001: 17-
21). Here, the focus on mechanisms of change illustrates how institutional 
complementarity is more helpfully deployed in explaining the differential effects of 
similar kinds of changes within capitalisms. The impact of a single institution in a given 
framework is mediated by the presence of other institutions, thus the same institution will 
produce different consequences across different institutional frameworks. For example, 
the piecemeal introduction of shareholder-oriented reforms in France detailed below 
charts their interaction with domestic institutions such as the intérêt social of the 
company. This produces different consequences than pro-shareholder mechanisms 
combined with principles of shareholder value, as in the UK. The resultant hybridised 
mix of French and ‘Anglo-Saxon’ corporate law norms represents an instance of what 
Campbell calls ‘translation’, or ‘the combination of locally available principles and 
practices with new ones originating elsewhere’ (2004: 65).  
 
Hybridisation and fragmentation of national models (Perraton & Clift 2004: 258), and 
‘recombination’ of different capitalist forms (Crouch 2005) provide far more persuasive 
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narratives than the convergence of capitalisms thesis. The reason is rooted in the 
mechanisms of change, and how they shape the impacts of international changes on the 
internal dynamics of capitalism. The first section establishes the context of the recent 
restructuring of French capitalism, and key evolutions in French capital markets. The 
remainder of the article identifies the key potential mechanisms of change. Analysis 
focuses on the financial market regulation regime, specific government regulatory 
policies in the field of corporate governance and company law, and the market for 
corporate control. Finally, the conclusion draws out the implications of these findings for 
comparative and international political economy analysis. 
 
The Restructuring of Financial Markets and Ownership within French Capitalism 
 
To a degree, the restructuring of French capitalism in the 1980s and early 1990s was 
carried out behind barriers that protected large firms from the demands of portfolio 
investors. These included the role of the state as both owner and orchestrator of ‘managed 
capitalism’, cross-shareholding, and interlocking board directorships. For example, the 
privatisation process between 1986-1988 was managed by finance minister Balladur to 
deliberately reinforce France’s protected ‘financial network economy’ (Schmidt 1996: 
369-392). Both Morin (1998; 2000) and Goyer (2003a & b) note significant shifts within 
the ‘financial networks’ that hitherto articulated the core of the French economic model, 
suggesting that those barriers are considerably more porous today. The reconstructing of 
noyaux durs (or ‘hard cores’ of interlocked investors) and creation of interlinking 
networks to articulate the French model of capitalism was, it seems, a transitional phase. 
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One marked feature of the restructuring process is the internationalisation of ownership 
and shareholding patterns in France. This departed from post-war norms, when foreign 
investment was discouraged, and even opposed by the French state (Michalet, 1997: 319-
20). From the mid-1990s, further privatisation became an important catalyst in the 
unravelling of the noyaux durs. 
 
The noyaux durs, previously maintained by merger and acquisition (M & A) strategies 
that sustained cross-shareholding, began to unravel in the late 1990s. The extremely 
healthy profit margins of French business from the mid-1980s onwards tended to be 
creamed off as profit rather than re-invested within French firms (Lordon 2001). Despite 
such healthy profit margins, a ‘conglomerate discount’ penalised French firms for the 
(perceivedly less efficient) organisational form, leading Goyer to argue that these large 
French firms were substantially under-capitalised in the mid-1990s (2003b). This 
opportunity to extract the surplus profits associated with a ‘correction’ in firms’ market 
value meant that, just as large equity stakes in these firms were becoming available 
through privatisation, and the liberalisation of French capital markets, there were strong 
incentives to invest in these companies. The equity stake of hard-core shareholder groups 
fell significantly, and the equity holding of foreign investors, notably Anglo-Saxon 
institutional investors, grew substantially.  
 
The expansion in foreign holdings on the French stock exchange is remarkable. Between 
1985 and 1997, foreign owners increased their share of stock exchange capitalisation 
from 10 per cent to 35 per cent (compared to 9 per cent in Britain, and 6 per cent in the 
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US) (Morin, 2000: 42). By November 2000, of CAC 40 (top 40 French firms), the 
average foreign equity holding was over 40 per cent - a record among world’s leading 
industrial nations (Maclean 2002: Table 7.7).  
 
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors’ strategic priorities were defence of ‘core business’, 
breaking up of conglomerates, externalising ‘non-strategic’ activities, and share buy 
backs as a means of increasing shareholder value (Morin, 1998, 21-48; 2000: 48-9).  
These, in combination with acquiring core business (notably research and development) 
overseas, were seen as the best means to raise the market capitalisation of the firms in 
which they had recently acquired stakes (Goyer 2003b). Rising market capitalisation of 
these large French firms in the late 1990s facilitated the process of M & A integral to 
restructuring because these transactions were increasingly carried out using not cash but 
equity swaps (Macaire & Rehfeldt 2001). M & A saw a very sharp increase, with 1999 
and 2000 showing particularly spectacular levels of French firm acquisition of foreign 
companies (UNCTAD 2003; Commissariat du Plan 2004: 27-33). This was the product 
of the partial unravelling of the noyaux durs. Selling cross-shareholdings reassured 
foreign investors that French firms were responsive to shareholder concerns (Morin 1998; 
2000: 38-42). This M & A activity focused on international concentration on core 
strategic activity, and differs from earlier noyau dur reinforcing strategies. This is 
particularly true of firms where US pension funds invested heavily, suggesting that the 
shareholder value dominant strategic paradigm is an important driver behind the 
contemporary restructuring (Kechidi 2003: tables 4 & 5).   
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AXA-UAP’s shareholding links with many key players across the various hard cores in 
the mid-to-late 1990s could have given AXA a pivotal role in orchestrating the financial 
nexus of France’s political economy, yet it chose to relinquish significant stakes in a 
range of major firms, including Crédit National, Schneider and Suez, and retained only 
those holdings it saw as essential to its core business. Such moves from the protective 
logic of unrelated cross-shareholdings within France’s ‘financial network economy’ 
(Morin 2000: 37), and towards Anglo-Saxon shareholder value norms began a trend since 
emulated by other significant players within the noyaux durs, notably with the Allianz-
AGF buy-out in 1997 (Morin 1998, 2000: 41; Goyer 2003; O’Sullivan, 2003). The degree 
of erosion of noyaux durs is considerable but not complete.2 Loriaux notes that ‘the hard 
core now represents less than 30 per cent of the capital for half of France’s blue chip, 
CAC 40 enterprises, less than 20 per cent for fifteen of the forty, and less than 10 per cent 
for five of the forty’ (2003: 116; see also Morin 2000: 39).  
 
A key mechanism of influence of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance is dispersal of 
ownership, yet the distribution of share ownership remains much more concentrated in 
France than is the case in either UK or US (O’Sullivan 2003: 42; Schmidt 2003: 539). 
Reinforcing the ‘protected capitalism’ image of French large firm ownership and control, 
and deviating from Anglo-Saxon norms, the level of family ownership of major French 
firms is the highest in Europe. In terms of both ownership of capital and voting rights, 15 
families control nearly 35 per cent of the capitalisation of the French stock market – with 
five families controlling 22 per cent of stock market capitalisation, and the top ten 
families 29 per cent. The equivalent levels for the UK are 4.1 per cent and 5.8 per cent 
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respectively (LeMaitre 2003). Significantly, the conglomerate restructuring noted above 
has not taken place evenly across all sectors or firms. In particular, large family-owned 
firms have in many cases not followed these prevalent trends (Goyer 2003b). Family 
dominates ownership and firm structures in approximately 50 of the top 100, including 
such household names as Michelin, Leclerc, and Peugeot (MacLean 2002: 211-12; 
Schmidt 2003: 540-1). More than half of the top 250 French firms are predominantly 
family owned (Lauer 2002).
  
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors – Trojan horses or sleeping partners? 
 
The proportion of foreign equity holdings on the Paris bourse has acquired totemic status 
within the French political economy debate as indicating a paradigm shift. The power of 
UK/US institutional investors to transform ‘domestic’ corporate governance practises is 
widely accepted (Morin 1998; 2000), and some see US institutional investors as Trojan 
horses of Anglo-Saxon capitalism (Desportes & Mauduit 1999). The degree of change 
needs to be carefully gauged across different aspects of corporate governance. The causal 
mechanisms by which the Anglo-Saxon influx brings about transformation needs to be 
specified, and the implications of these changes for the French model of capitalism need 
to be set out with precision.  
 
Whilst it is straightforward to establish the shareholder-value oriented preferences of 
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors, it is much trickier to establish to what extent these 
preferences prevail.  It is difficult to causally link this ownership of equity with any direct 
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impact on how firms behave strategically. Morin sees Anglo-Saxon institutional investors 
as active shareholders, monitoring management methods and decisions and making their 
voices heard (1998), yet he also points to the interaction of Anglo-Saxon norms with 
enduring French institutions, including the French social model (2000: 47-8). Kechidi 
insists that new ownership patterns involve ‘influencing behaviour’ of firms, not 
‘controlling’ them (2003). Aglietta and Rebérioux, (2005: 62), building on the work of 
Boutillier et al (2002) note that the levels of holdings in any one company are small – 
normally between two and three per cent, thus Anglo-Saxon institutional investors ‘have 
taken their place in the ‘float’ of company equity’, but that they remain ‘outside the 
structures and controlling interest’, they ‘the ability and desire of these investors to 
impose their views in a foreign context is doubtful’. 
 
This chimes with other work on the inter-relationship between funds and French firms, 
which points to the weakness of the transmission belts translating Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance preferences into practice. The dominant trend is an information-cost effective 
‘passive monitoring’ rather than shareholder activism. Funds remain ‘external’ actors, 
and minority shareholders within. Foreign institutional investment funds do not exploit 
opportunities to influence management decisions directly. With the exception of the (few) 
speculative funds managed by ‘raiders’, fund managers do not seek direct influence in 
‘operational’ firm decision-making (Plihon, Ponssard and Zarlowski 2002: 163). This 
suggests a limited impact of the influx of Anglo-Saxon institutional investors, and helps 
account for the diversity of responses, within French corporate governance, to financial 
globalisation. 
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Mechanisms of change … the Transformation of French Corporate Governance? 
 
If the funds tend not to rely on direct influence, then what mechanisms might bring about 
the mooted Anglo-Saxon transformations within French capitalism? How, for example, 
have the incentives of the key French corporate actors changed? The following section 
isolates three key mechanisms of change within French corporate governance. Attention 
focuses first on the regulatory context of French financial markets and its recent 
evolution. Secondly, a wide-ranging legislative reform of corporate governance, the 
Nouvelles Régulations Economiques (NRE), is considered, before analysing the market 
for corporate control in France.  
 
In this way, the mechanisms by which changing ownership patterns of French capitalism 
might bring about a reshaping of the financial architecture of French corporate 
governance, and a transformation of the logic of French corporate capitalism, are 
identified. It is then possible to examine the degree to which the changes mooted above 
have indeed taken place. Analysis proceeds in the spirit of Crouch’s ‘recombinant 
capitalism’ approach, which identifies the need to ‘deconstruct the wholes that 
contemporary institutionalism takes for granted and discover their constituent elements – 
elements which are able to survive in combinations other than those thus identified’ 
(2005: 439-440). 
 
Mechanism 1: French financial market regulation 
 13
French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy 
 
Financial market regulation is one key element (alongside company law and labour law) 
within the  ‘nexus of institutions’ (Cioffi 2000: 574) which constitute the corporate 
governance regime. The institutional and regulatory context of French financial markets 
has evolved significantly in recent years, partly in response to the internationalisation of 
French capital markets. The Commission des Opérations de Bourse (COB) was initially 
modelled on the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1967. It has played a 
key role in the development of French financial markets. Liberalising ‘re-regulatory’ 
reforms in the 1980s transformed French financial markets along Anglo-Saxon lines. 
These included creating the French futures market, the Second Marché of unlisted 
securities, and decompartmentalising and freeing up securities, futures and foreign 
exchange markets (Loriaux 1991: 214-225; Cerny 1989: 178-83). These reforms involved 
a substantial extension of the regulatory oversight powers of the COB. The COB has 
recently been further empowered through the NRE (Aglietta & Rebérioux 2005: 61), and 
its role in ensuring transparency of information passed to shareholders has expanded. 
Furthermore, the COB has increased the transparency requirements it must itself meet 
(Frison-Roche 2002: 79, 82-90). US-style centralisation of market authorities has also 
been emulated, with the merging of the COB and the Financial Markets Council into the 
Autorité des Marché Financiers (AMF) in 2003 (Aglietta & Rebérioux 2005: 61).  
 
Although much comparative capitalisms literature sees institutional complementarities as 
shoring up persistence and dual convergence (Hall & Soskice 2001: 14-21), Goyer rightly 
points out that the constraining effect of ‘institutional complementarities’ should not be 
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overstated (2003b: 202-4). Specific aspects of French corporate governance have 
changed dramatically in recent years, despite the fact that they hitherto dovetailed with a 
range of other institutional features of French capitalism. Such ‘institutional 
complementarities’ did not, in this instance, prevent evolution. In financial market 
regulation, independent regulatory authorities based on Anglo-Saxon self-regulatory 
models have been established and recognised despite their paucity of fit with traditional 
French hierarchical authority structures and legal norms detailed below (Magnier 2002: 
68). 
 
Frison-Roche regards the influence of the French financial market authorities on 
management as analogous to that of foreign investment funds, encouraging focus upon 
rates of return, ‘shareholder value’ oriented management decisions, and transparency 
(Frison-Roche 2002: 79, 82-90). Thus those identifying convergence towards Anglo-
Saxon shareholder value norms find succour in the changes to French financial market 
regulation (Cioffi 2000). As Aglietta and Rebérioux (scholars sharply critical of the 
convergence thesis) note of French financial market law, ‘signs of convergence are 
therefore evident: the transparency of information given to shareholders as a whole has 
progressed greatly, while the role of market authorities continues to grow’ (2005: 61). 
 
Yet before extrapolating from these changes in the French financial regulatory 
framework, one should ask what impact they have had on the behaviour, organisation, 
and market operations of large French firms? In the crucial area of transparency, where 
much new regulatory activity has been directed, the evidence presented below suggests 
 15
French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy 
only limited change. Despite two decades of institutional and regulatory evolution 
towards Anglo-Saxon norms, practice continues to diverge.  
 
French firms have been reluctant to institute a thorough-going shift to greater 
transparency.  Some of France’s largest firms still resist the push towards transparency 
and accountability (Maclean 2002: 210), baulking at introducing international accounting 
standards, or more stringent criteria for awarding options (O’Sullivan 2003: 41), and 
neglecting to monitor executive compensation, presenting an open door to financial 
scandal (Goyer 2003a). Of the 100 largest French firms quoted on the Paris bourse, only 
35 had adopted international accounting standards in 1997, and this number had only 
risen to 38 by 2000 (Goyer 2003b: 188-9, 196). This should all be situated in the context 
of the historic opacity of the French system of corporate governance (Maclean 2002; 
O’Sullivan 2003). The fact that an historically non-transparent regime has undergone 
only minor change despite the best efforts of an empowered regulatory authority suggests 
the very opposite of the ‘functional convergence’ comparative political economy thesis 
(Gilson 2003; Coffee 1999). This argues that an absence of formal institutional change is 
deceptive, because actual practice within capitalism maybe converging on Anglo-Saxon 
norms despite the absence of institutional changes. Here, it seems, formal institutional 
change has been achieved, but it has not succeeded in changing firm practices. What has 
emerged is a ‘complex amalgam,’ a ‘recombination’ (Crouch 2005) of pre-existing 
(opaque) French corporate norms with new financial market authorities prioritising 
transparency in a configuration characterised by ‘a degree of complication and apparent 
incoherence’ (Crouch 2005: 453). 
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Mechanism 2: The Nouvelles Régulations Economiques 
 
Culpepper claims that the French state has been ‘excised’ from finance and corporate 
governance (2004: 14-15). The bolstered role of the financial regulatory authorities 
detailed above suggests this view is erroneous. As Vogel (1996: 1-5, 16-24), and before 
that Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 71, 79-80, 146-7, 258) have demonstrated, freer markets 
paradoxically involve more rules. The ‘liberalisation’ and internationalisation of French 
financial markets have led to their re-regulation (Vogel 1996: 237-243), and the 
centralisation and empowerment of financial market authorities. This is consistent with 
Levy’s ‘the state also rises’ thesis, with new state activities being developed in an age of 
globalisation (2006). Thus Culpepper’s assertion does not accurately characterise modes 
of contemporary state co-ordination. Moreover, it fails to capture how the French state 
continues to attempt to pursue a quasi-dirigiste strategy, by novel means, and with less 
direct intervention (Clift 2001; Loriaux 2003; Maclean 2002; Schmidt 2003). 
 
The French state’s role as quasi—dirigiste actor in the process of the re-regulation of 
French corporate governance and financial markets was distilled into the Nouvelles 
Régulations Economiques (NRE) in May 2001. These began life in the context of 
Socialist Prime Minister Jospin’s aspirations to manage the economic impacts of 
globalisation more effectively. Specifically, after the September 1999 Affaire Michelin, 
involving 7,500 layoffs, despite profits for the first half of 1999 being up 17 per cent 
(Forrester 2000: 113-4), Jospin sought to limit ‘abusive layoffs’ (Jospin 1999) oriented 
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solely towards increasing return on equity. This initial impetus was added to, arguably hi-
jacked, by Treasury officials seeking to transform the French legislative environment in 
relation to competition law and mergers and acquisitions, as well as corporate governance 
(Tiberghien 2004: 19-20). 
 
In addition to empowerment of state actors in the re-regulation of French financial 
markets, there has also been a partial judicialisation of French corporate governance. This 
trend has seen judges, rather than state actors, empowered in certain important respects. 
The resultant complex amalgam involves increased judicial activism co-existing with 
state activism, some of it novel, some more familiar. The key point here is that the 
mechanism of change, French company law, pushes evolution in a peculiar direction. 
 
Elements of the NRE are consistent with the Anglo-Saxon evolution in French financial 
market regulation, especially the way the role of law is conceived. Frison-Roche notes 
how the NRE distributes rights ‘to contest judicially the decisions of managers’ (2002: 
81). These rights of litigation apply not just to shareholders, but to all stakeholders. 
Furthermore, all company and related office holders can be tackled, including works 
councils and regulatory authorities. Magnier (2002: 67-72) discerns a general trend in the 
role of law within French corporate governance into which the NRE can be situated. The 
traditional interventionist, directive and regulatory instincts of the French state in relation 
to the private sector have been resisted. Earlier in the 1990s, this was illustrated in the 
Viénot reports on corporate governance, written under the aegis of the French Patronat, 
and characterised by Magnier as ‘a mode of regulation without any state intervention’ 
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(2002: 68).  The model being emulated, involving an appeal to the spirit of responsibility 
(accountability) of managers, but containing no coercive element, draws inspiration from 
the US Principles of corporate governance developed by American law institute and the 
American Bar Association (Magnier 2002: 68). 
 
In this new context, it is increasingly judges, rather than state actors, who exercise 
influence over firm managers. Whereas traditionally, French law frames the activities of 
firm office-holders with procedures which, a priori, constrain their actions, in this US 
tradition, concrete, substantial controls are more important than procedures, and a 
posteriori judgements upon managers’ decisions play a key role. This approach is 
unusual in the French context, where law is constructed around the abstract notion of the 
general interest, secured and protected through the state’s hierarchical superiority.  
 
Self-regulation of corporate governance according to professional norms (set out in the 
Viénot and Bouton reports) reinforces the need for judicial control, given the possibility 
of litigation by economic actors. Corporate governance norms thus play a preventative 
role, avoiding litigation arising. This situation calls into question judicial power, and 
evidence suggests an increasing power of judges within corporate governance, and more 
instances of judicial activism (Alcouffe 2000: 138 & 140; Magnier 2002: 69; Aglietta & 
Rebérioux 2005: 61). The changes in regulation raise questions about the boundaries 
between the public and the private, treading novel territory in terms of French regulatory 
and legal traditions. In their wake has come a more litigious corporate culture, 
empowering judges to evaluate a posteriori executive decision-making. To the extent that 
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this new understanding of the role of law pervades, this represents an Anglo-Saxon shift. 
As Magnier puts it, this creates conditions potentially conducive to the ‘judicialisation’ of 
company law, contemporaneous to the ‘financialisation’ of French capitalism (2002: 70). 
Frison-Roche talks of an attempted ‘hostile takeover’ of French company law (2002: 79).  
 
Within a context of wider corporate governance debates, La Porta et al (1998) see the 
quality of law protecting minority shareholders as the crucial determinant of the degree of 
dispersion of share ownership, the nature of equity markets, and the broader corporate 
governance regime. In this light, moving away from ‘roman’ law towards Anglo-Saxon 
common law could be of cardinal importance, representing a turning point on the road to 
convergence. Yet how effectively can these changes graft US legal norms onto French 
company law? National legal systems are not particularly amenable to convergence 
pressures. The idea of self-regulation according to professional codes, and the reliance on 
litigation between conflicting interests, has been only partially inculcated within French 
law and French capitalism. Most obviously, it sits uneasily with statutes and legislation 
that still fastidiously organise the internal relations of firms (Magnier 2002: 68). 
 
The most significant illustration that this import cannot be interpreted as convergence is 
the importance, within French judges’ deliberations, of the notion of intérêt social (social 
interest) of the firm. As the first Viénot report notes, it simply does not exist in Anglo-
Saxon law, yet it plays a key role in French company law; 
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In Anglo-Saxon countries the emphasis is for the most part placed on the 
objective of maximising share values, whilst on the European continent and 
France in particular the emphasis is placed more on the human assets and 
resources of the company (1995: 935) 
 
It defines the social interest of the company as; 
 
 the greater interest of the body itself … the company considered as an 
autonomous economic agent pursuing its own ends, distinct notably from those of 
its shareholders, employees, creditors (including tax authorities), suppliers and 
customers, but which correspond to their common general interest, which is to 
ensure the prosperity of the company (1995: 8) 
 
As if to demonstrate how far removed from the shareholder value paradigm intérêt social 
can be, Alcouffe notes that it is partially derived from the encyclicals of the Catholic 
Church, rooted in the ideas of Thomas Aquinas. Regarding the aim of the company, these 
stipulate that it  
 
is not merely the acquisition of profit but is the very existence of the company as 
a community of people who in their different ways search to satisfy their 
fundamental needs and who constitute a group peculiar to the service of the 
community as a whole (quoted in Alcouffe 2000; 134-5). 
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Increasing judicial activism involves more judgements in relation to this intérêt social of 
the company as a distinct entity (Alcouffe 2000: 133-135), thus much hinges on its 
interpretation. In the affaire André,3 a high profile example where judges were called 
upon to adjudicate between management and two Anglo-Saxon institutional investors in a 
dispute which hinged on the definition of intérêt social, the judges found in favour of the 
management (Magnier 2002: 70-71). Interpretations of the intérêt social are contested 
within French corporate governance, yet all concur that it does not equate to shareholder 
interest (Alcouffe 2000; Frison-Roche 2002: 81).  
 
The notion of intérêt social also interacts with long-standing traditions of Président - 
Directeur Général (PDG) autonomy within French firms. This has changed little, with 
the exceptional PDG autonomy being retained as French capitalism has restructured.4 To 
give one salient example, intérêt social interacts with impediments to the market for 
corporate control (see below). The retention of privileged shares and unequal voting 
rights can be justified in the ‘common interest of the company members’ (Alcouffe 2000: 
130), as distinct from the shareholder interest. It is often interpreted as through 
management activity, ‘via powers and rights devolved to the heads of companies, the 
managers and administrators’ (Alcouffe 2000: 135), that intérêt social is expressed. Thus 
intérêt social can in practice be used by management to enhance their very considerable 
autonomy. 
 
Another important corollary of the intérêt social of the company is that it incorporates a 
wider range of actors than only shareholders or managers. Here Prime Minister Jospin 
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had laid out in 1999 his desire to improve the consultation and information procedures 
with regard to salaried employees (Jospin 1999), and these were realised in the NRE. 
This highlights counter-tendencies within the NRE, and tells against interpreting the 
episode as convergence on Anglo-Saxon norms. In terms of stakeholder ‘versus’ 
shareholder conceptions of and approaches to corporate governance, the NRE is 
conspicuously ‘stakeholder’ oriented. The company in France is seen as something other 
than the property only of the shareholders, hence the right, stipulated in Article 99 of the 
NRE (Journal Officiel 2001: 7793), of representatives of the comité d’entreprise (works 
council) to attend shareholder assemblées générales, and receive the same information to 
which shareholders are entitled. The NRE gives workers the same rights of access to 
judges which shareholders currently enjoy (Plihon 2003: 50), and diversifies the sets of 
interests that executives must take into account along stakeholder lines, conferring on 
employees the right to express a defence of their interests in firm decisions (Frison-Roche 
2002: 77-91). All this, of course, points in the opposite direction to the shareholder value 
model. 
 
The conception of workers’ interests underpinning this stakeholder approach construes 
them as analogous to shareholders’ interests (see Jospin 1999). This is a paradoxical shift, 
given potentially antagonistic interests of shareholders and workers (Frison-Roche 2002: 
86), which NRE provisions relating to layoffs and plans sociaux (redundancy plans) are 
likely to bring to the fore. In the French case, the discordant nature of shareholder and 
worker interests is reinforced by the fact that workers lack sufficient power within the 
firm to exploit any greater transparency and disclosure to their advantage. This reduces 
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the likelihood of a pro-transparency shareholder-worker coalition similar to that detected 
in Germany (Jackson Hoepner & Kurdelbusch 2005: 112-114). Furthermore, intérêt 
social, whilst preventing exclusively shareholder-oriented strategies, has not been 
deployed to enhance the status of workers within firms. Therefore there is little prospect 
of the worker empowerment (Goyer & Hancké 2005: 190-194). 
 
The shareholder AGMs, which worker representatives have a right to attend, are not the 
sites of the crucial decisions, for example, relating to redundancy plans, restructuring or 
wage policies. These decisions take place amongst senior management, where workers 
have no rights of access. Even where they do have a say, the best workers representatives 
can realistically hope to achieve is a delaying of the decision process (Montagne, Pernot 
and Sauviat, 2002: 3). As Goyer & Hancké put it (2005: 189) ‘[w]hile French workers 
and their representatives have strong information rights, they have no formal veto rights’. 
Thus the attempt to specify a role for a wider range of stakeholders within the NRE does 
not necessarily translate into their empowerment. 
 
Overall, labour has not been empowered within French corporate governance, but given 
the ideologically fragmented and confrontational history of French industrial relations 
(Milner 1995: 229), this is best interpreted as persistence, rather than convergence. 
Organised labour’s limited power and influence in the contemporary French model is not 
‘brought about’ by globalisation, rather, the latter constitutes a new context within which 
the enduring weakness of French labour manifests itself. 
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The UK influenced ‘good’ corporate governance agenda (OECD 1999; 2004) demands 
the separation of the position of PDG into two discrete posts. The failure of the US 
model, where three quarters of large company bosses combine the roles of chairman of 
the board and CEO (Monks & Minow 2004: 208), to live up to its Anglo-Saxon ideal 
type should be noted here. The NRE allows for such a split to be introduced into French 
firms (Journal Officiel 2001: 7794), but it does not tackle the issue of the respective roles 
of each, nor indeed the role of the board in the changed constitutional context (Magnier 
2002: 73). The post itself has not, in most cases, been split into two, and the all-powerful 
PDG, who is both chair of the board and CEO remains the norm. The NRE explicitly 
conveys in Article 107 on the PDG a free reign to act ‘the most extensive and wide-
ranging powers’5 (Journal Officiel 2001: 7794) in all areas except those where the law 
specifies a role for shareholder assemblies, or the board. The presumption, therefore, 
remains the widest freedom to act for the PDG. As Alcouffe notes ‘such is the power of 
the PDG that it is considered “bad manners” for the board to take a vote on a decision, as 
it would show that the PDG had lost the confidence of the board’ (2000: 129).  
 
Traditionally, French law made it difficult for shareholders to vote, requiring voting 
intentions to be registered seven days in advance (Frison-Roche 2002). The NRE reduces 
the transaction costs involved in voting. Chapter 5 sets out the shareholders’ rights, 
facilitating the participation of minority shareholders in shareholder meetings through 
electronic voting and video-conferencing, and significantly lowers the threshold required 
to ask written questions of the PDG (down from a 10 per cent to a 5 per cent holding). If 
no response is forthcoming, the law provides for experts to be appointed to report on the 
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firm’s operations (Journal Officiel 2001: 7798). According to Plihon, the NRE ‘can be 
considered as a weakening of the power of managers in favour of shareholders’ (2003: 
49). 
 
In the important area of transparency, the NRE substantially bolstered disclosure 
requirements for remuneration of all executive office holders (Art. 116), challenging the 
historic opacity of French corporate governance in general, and executive remuneration 
in particular.6 Although there remains some ambiguity as to what counts as 
‘remuneration’ (Magnier 2002: 73), this increased disclosure is politically significant, 
given public disquiet at the introduction of ‘stock options’ during the controversial 
restructuring of the French food producing multi-national Danone in 2001. The rationale 
behind the layoffs was not a lack of profitability of the plant, but rather that financial 
market performance had not been sufficiently good to deliver stock option bonuses for 
executives (Mottis and Ponssard 2002: 140). This was widely interpreted as a dangerous 
portent of American-style capitalisme sauvage arriving on French soil. 
 
However, despite NRE reforms, questions remain surrounding the transparency, the level, 
and the nature of executive remuneration (Jeffers & Magnier 2002: 61-3). This, combined 
with the uneven distribution of new transparency-oriented corporate governance 
institutions and processes (Goyer 2003a: 6; O’Sullivan 2003: 41), indicate the problems 
of extrapolating from this dramatic example. The ability of these executive incentivising 
oriented changes to transform corporate behaviour may be more limited than the case of 
Danone suggests. There remains widespread resistance amongst some of France’s largest 
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firms to the push towards transparency and accountability (Goyer 2003b 194-7; 
O’Sullivan 2003: 58). Furthermore, the public outcry at the Danone saga demonstrated 
that the shareholder value paradigm has not taken root within French society, and popular 
capitalism is still not that popular (O’Sullivan 2003: 42; Hancké 2002 51-5). 
 
Thus overall the NRE increases transparency requirements, and seeks to limit to 
management autonomy. Yet it also diversifies the sets of interests that executives must 
take into account along stakeholder lines. The NRE conceives of the role of law in a 
distinctly ‘Anglo-Saxon’ manner. Yet the content of French company law, and the 
enduring central importance of the concept of intérêt social of the company, indicates 
ongoing divergence from the ‘shareholder value’ paradigm. Crouch’s ‘recombinant 
institutions’ approach helps explain this complex configuration, with elements of more 
than one model co-existing within ‘empirical incongruences’ (2005: 453). This example 
is further testament to the process of hybridisation within the French model, a more 
modest, but a more defensible claim than assertions of convergence. 
 
Mechanism 3: The Market for Corporate Control 
 
Perhaps the most important mechanism by which the increased significance of capital 
markets for corporate funding is supposed in theory to change the behaviour and 
operations of firms is through the market for corporate control. Hitherto, the noyaux durs 
had been the crux of French ‘protected capitalism’, and the placing of controlling stakes 
in ‘safe’ hands provided an effective barrier to hostile takeovers. As noted above – these 
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noyaux durs partially unravelled between 1995 and 2000. Some cite the BNP Paribas 
takeover in 2000 as evidence that a market for corporate control has emerged as a result 
(Cioffi 2000). If true, this marks a fundamental shift in French capitalism. Yet hostile 
takeovers remain comparatively rare in France. Only 3 hostile takeovers involving large 
firms7 took place in France between 2000 and 2004 (Culpepper 2005, 193), and only 19 
hostile takeovers took place between 1991 and 2000 (Montagne, Pernot & Sauviat, 
2002), illustrating that the French market for corporate control remains underdeveloped. 
 
Thus, despite the demise of the noyaux durs, obstacles remain in the path of Anglo-Saxon 
market discipline. Some long-established characteristics of French corporate capitalism, 
including the enduring concentration of ownership and the internal constitutions of 
companies, continue to insulate management. One mechanism through which ‘insiders’ 
are empowered at the expense of ‘outsiders’ is differential shareholder voting rights. 
Much importance is attached to the ‘one share, one vote, one dividend’ principle within 
Anglo-Saxon influenced calls for ‘good’ corporate governance (OECD 1999; 2004). 
Once again we should note a disparity between the theory and practice of Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism. In reality, the US model in particular represents an ‘impure’ form of the 
Anglo-Saxon ideal type, with unequal voting rights a prevalent feature of its corporate 
governance arrangements (Monks & Minow 2004: 122-126), part of management’s 
hidden protectionist arsenal (Charkham 2005: 263-6, 276-286). Nevertheless, both UK 
and US institutional investors with significant stakes in French firms prioritise ‘one share, 
one vote’. For all this, it has not become the French norm. A number of distinctive 
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constitutional features designed to empower majority shareholders and marginalise 
minority shareholders highlight the enduring singularity of French corporate governance. 
 
Double votes, although strictly regulated within French law, remain legal and attenuate 
accountability to market sentiment within large French companies. These can be used to 
‘lock up’ the capital of a firm, and operate as an anti-takeover device, the ‘poison pill’ so 
disparaged by foreign institutional investors. As well as double votes, a range of voting 
ceilings limit the voting rights of certain investors. Both unequal voting rights and 
ownership ceilings are much more prevalent in France than in any other major economy 
(Goyer 2003a: 3). Furthermore, such practices are increasingly prevalent, suggesting 
their use as new instruments to limit foreign capital influence in French firms, replacing 
the noyaux durs (Magnier 2002: 73-4; Goyer 2003b 197 & Table 6.5). Thus, in reaction 
the influx of foreign mutual and pension funds, large French firms are engaged in 
‘defensive institutional engineering’ (Markus 2005), using these mechanisms to resist the 
voice and influence of foreign capital within French capitalism.  This is clearly a 
significant development in large French firms’ organising of their corporate governance 
arrangements, of particular importance when interpreting the implications of the influx of 
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors. 
 
In relation to takeovers, the NRE has introduced further financial transparency 
requirements upon potential takeover bidders (Journal Officiel 2001: 7776-7), requiring 
them, for example, to communicate with employees regarding their industrial strategy. 
There are also requirements for enhanced communication with the public, and other 
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companies. Most significantly, the NRE does not eradicate any of the long standing 
impediments to takeovers noted above, therefore the NRE does not facilitate hostile 
takeovers. Thus this most important mechanism by which market discipline should in 
theory be brought to bear on firms and managers does not operate in the prescribed form 
in France (Hancké 2002: 26; O’Sullivan 2003: 25; Aglietta & Rebérioux 2005:  70). 
 
In addition to state actors’ legislative interventions, French state actors have recently re-
engaged dramatically in the public debate surrounding hostile takeovers. In another 
example of quasi-dirigiste interventionism, as rumours spread of a possible hostile 
takeover of Danone by Pepsi in July 2005, the Interior and Finance Ministers 
vociferously opposed the move. Sarkozy said the government ‘could not remain inactive 
when faced with a hostile takeover bid’ for Danone. The public authorities had to ‘do 
their utmost’ and deploy all their ‘powers of persuasion’ to block the move.8 Notably 
they sought the Caisse des depots to deploy its considerable holdings, and exploit the 
poison pill clause within Danone’s statutes which could prevent Pepsi taking control 
unless they could muster in excess of 66 per cent of the shares. The French state’s open 
hostility to the planned bid may have been a key factor in scuppering the takeover, which 
never materialised. Similar dirigiste motives explained Finance Minister Thierry Bréton’s 
orchestration, in March 2006, of the merger of Gaz de France with Suez to protect the 
latter from a potential hostile takeover by the Italian energy giant Enel,9 and the French 
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Conclusions 
 
At a glance from the global level, the changes in French financial market operations and 
regulation suggest evidence of convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon liberal market 
economy. However, when attention is focused on the mechanisms of change within 
models of capitalism, as here, the need to admit the notion of diversity in the explanation 
and characterisation asserts itself forcefully in seeking to understand how capitalism 
works in particular settings. 
 
The central contention of this article is that the reason why the global convergence thesis 
misrepresents contemporary evolutions can be sought in insufficient attention being paid 
to mechanisms of change within models of capitalism. Secondly, this analysis has 
demonstrated how a ‘recombinant capitalism’ approach (Crouch 2005), framing its 
analysis in terms of hybridisation and fragmentation of national models, offers greater 
explanatory purchase over the French model, does less violence to the facts, and as such 
offers a promising way out of the ‘convergence or persistence’ impasse.  
 
Analysis of the mechanisms by which a transformed international political economic 
context might bring about changes within French capitalism has highlighted the problems 
of equating an influx of Anglo-Saxon institutional investors with a convergence of 
French corporate governance upon ‘Anglo-Saxon’ shareholder value norms. Foreign 
institutional investors are indeed a key motor for change within French capitalism, but 
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that change is best understood as hybridisation, and ‘recombination’ of elements drawn 
from different models of capitalism. 
 
 The differential success of the institutions of shareholder value capitalism across 
different areas highlights the uneven distribution of new corporate governance 
institutions and practices within French capitalism. There are clear areas of Anglo-Saxon 
influence, notably in the area of financial market regulation. Yet the formal institutional 
change achieved has not transformed firm practices, with emergent transparency norms 
only partially inculcated into French capitalism. In relation to a number of extremely 
important potential mechanisms, there are enduring specificities that present major 
impediments to the ‘shareholder value’ paradigm, and its influence within French 
capitalism. Reactive mechanisms (double shares, voting ceilings) have been introduced, 
and these have erected new obstacles to a market for corporate control already hindered 
in the French context by the concentration of ownership.  
 
This analysis of the import of shareholder empowering institutions into French capitalism 
also has implications for our understanding of institutional complementarity, one of the 
key notions within the Varieties of Capitalism paradigm (Hall & Soskice 2001: 17-21). 
Here, institutional complementarity has been deployed not to explain persistence, but to 
show how the impact of a single institution in a given framework is mediated by the 
presence of other institutions, thus the same institution will produce different 
consequences across different institutional frameworks. The shareholder-oriented reforms 
were introduced in piecemeal fashion in France, yet their combination with and 
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interaction with domestic institutions such as the intérêt social of the company produces 
different consequences than pro-shareholder mechanisms combined with principles of 
shareholder value, as in the UK. Thus similar institutional changes can produce different 
outcomes because change is located in a different (evolving and dynamic) set of 
institutional complementarities.  
 
In this way, institutional complementarities channel change in particular directions, 
generating the diversity. Hybridisation, and recombination of capitalist institutions drawn 
from different models, provides a more convincing narrative than convergence to account 
for the changes outlined above. In a broader context, this highlights the importance of 
analysing the interaction of domestic and international factors in the political economy of 
capitalist restructuring. It further highlights the importance of carefully specifying the 
mechanisms of change when assessing the impact of international political economic 
change upon national models of capitalism. Factoring domestic mechanisms of change 
into the transnational approach represents a challenging but promising avenue of inquiry 
for understanding the political economy of global capitalism, combining the insights of 
comparative political economy and IPE analysis.  
                                                 
2 In 2002, networks of influence constructed around three big banks – BNP, Société Générale and 
Crédit Lyonnais remained in place, and thirty directors enjoyed between them 160 seats on the 
boards of major French firms (Orange 2002). 
3 In February 2000, the investment funds NR Atticus and Wyser-Pratte & Co. sought to sanction 
the management and change the composition of the board through their voting rights (32  per cent 
and 9  per cent respectively). Management sought to sell controlling shares to an ally, in order to 
reduce the funds’ influence. The funds accused management of trying to protect their position 
against the intérêt social of the firm.  The judges deemed they could not be certain that 
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management actions were against the intérêt social of the company, and found in favour of the 
management (Magnier 2002: 70-71). 
4  Clift 2004: 340-342; Schmidt 2003: 539-40; Loriaux 2003: 113-4 & 117-8; Hancké 2002: 62-5 
5 ‘les pouvoirs les plus étendus’ 
6 Significantly, the NRE brought transparency requirements to bear on non-quoted, as well as 
quoted companies. Non-quoted companies had hitherto been largely shielded from the 
transformations noted earlier in this article, and are often characterised as ‘opaque’ and 
‘monolithic’. Even in the wake of this change, there remains a gulf between quoted and non-
quoted companies (Frison-Roche 2002: 79, 82-90), which remain – transparency requirements 
aside - outside the new regulatory requirements.  
7 where the deal was worth $100 million or more 
8 ‘Sarkozy et Danone : ni passivité ni nationalisation rampante’, Le Monde 22 07 2005 
9  ‘Suez-GDF-Enel : le choc des patriotismes, le poids des réseaux’, Le Monde 05 03 2006. 
10 Le patriotisme, Arcelor et les PME’, Le Monde 05 02 2006 
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